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• Jj Tape II, pl 
. A continuation of Tape I: those present, site, and time - same. 
!'fF' - I sat right next to Dennis and Wiggins, and I had never seen two people, 
no matter what came up in that evidentiary presentation, who were less 
moved • 
TR - It seemed that St .Clair by his demeanor kinda acted like Wiggins should 
cave in. [?] 
WF - No, I think those guys and some other politicians had given him too 
much credit. I think we had virtue on our side. We had it. They knew 
it. Th,ey' were on a losing team, and they .found something they could 
grab hold of in St.Clair. 
CB - That's what I thought. 
- WF - They got him where he [st.Clair J was the only one out there. 
TR - Carlos Morehead was another ••• 
HF - St.Clair killed himself. All that talk about national security •••• 
JM - I'd just sit and fume. 
WC - I was f'lllling all along. Caldwell and I were talking most of the time 
in this entire proceeding, and yet I didn't know what you [CB] were 
going to do. You shocked me one time on Kalmbach.... I felt sorry- for 
him. He was a pretty decent .fellow, and he was on the rocks like 
everybody else. I heard your comments, Caldwell, you said, "Bullshit, 
he's stuped, even when they tell him what the facts are, he would still 
simpl.7 go out and do it." Your reaction was that the gey i:5 not that 
dumb. 
CB - That's right. 
WP - You know I still can't beleve that they haven't indicted Bittman. 
TR - I don't get it either. 
CB - and O"'13?-ien, that poor .fellow. 
WF - It was the soldier with the commander-in-chief. Pat Gray was a 
political operative to start off with. He wasn't a career civil 
servant; I put them in a little different category. In faet, Gray 
was not one of our witne•sesand I never did see him in the place, :50 
I didn't feel the same way about him as I did about Peterson. 
JM - Maybe not, but he was a career man, wasn't he? 
WF - Gray did something and then they vack him in as an FBI man - that 
was something! 
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TM - For the second meeting of the coalition, I came up with draft five, and 
to this moment, I have not been able in m::, own mind satisfactorily to 
conclude whetaer or not the group met Tuesday afternoon. The first 
meeting was with the -de.finite intent of getting back together at some 
point. I recall drafting in rq office when Railsback called and asked, 
"Would Hutchinson fire you if he knew that you were working on articles 
of impachment?" 
HF - Certainly. 
TM - And that kind of took me by surprise. 
LAUGHTER. 
T.M - Do ;rou have aey indication that he is thinking that way? What happened, 
I believe, was that one of the ~• s writers, Cannon, had contacted_ 
Railsback, saying he had learned that there is a group of members 
gathered and were drafting articles one and two. And that this was a 
quiet, silent, secretive group. By noon the press had had this and of 
course it was overshadowed that same day when Hogan had his press con-
ference and announced his position. 
JM - As a matter of fact, after our first meeting, didn't we sneak out the . 
back-door .becasue the press was outside? 
RT - Right. _ 
WC - May , I :go thru lf11 notes on what happened, Tom? That first meeting I . 
arrivedabout 8:30. It lasted to about 10:00. Railsback and I went 
to a caucus and we were late getting there. There was a lµla.nimous 
consent that Garrison should take oYer as cheif minority counsel, and 
Railsback and I asked to be recorded as "no" on that. So at 10:00 
they were still caucusing with the Republicans there. 
HF - I was not . there with you at that time. 
CB - I wasn't there either. 
WC - The meeting of the Judiciary Collllllittee started at 10:30 or so. They 
were anxious to get the caucus over to get down to the meeting, and 
at ll:35 I .have a note here: "meeting of Judiciary started. A mess." 
"No one .knows what is going on." 
CB - It was supposed to be ani.nforma.l meeting. 
we - At ll:35 Hogan. received a call from Jerry Ford, the rice-president. 
vc -
TR - I don~t. -remember that. /Hogan had scheduled his press conference that 
afternoon, and he got up and walked out and then we had a general dis-
cussion. 
WF - You did.r}.'t. know what Hogan vas going to do then? 
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TR - No, I met with Hogan that morning, Tuesday. I tried to convince not 
to come out against impeachment precipitously, and he would not give 
me arq clue. I met with him in Mooney's office. 
WF - He was really playing games, wasn't he? 
TR - Yeah, he wouldn't give me an :1nkJ :ing what he was going to do. 
CB - Here is waht rrq notes say about that meeting. Big news was that Larry 
Hogan is getting ready to have apress conference and announce how he is 
going _to vote. While he was sitting there the Tice-president called 
him. There is a pret,~y little girl over there who is coming in and 
out and upsetting everybody, and she came in with the word for Hogan 
that the vice-president was calling him. Well, Larry was obviously 
a little bit upset. Ve knew the vice-presidnet was calling him and 
I will anxious to find out which way. He came back, and then went 
on and ■ade his statement. 
WC - That afternoon I had an interview with a guy from the Bangor Daily 
News that took 110st of the afternoon. Hogan at 3: 00 made his 
decision to vote !or impachment and was immediately attacked by 
Dean Birch,who was rwming the president's campaign, as a purely 
political decision. I have here: at 5:20 we resumed a meeting and 
a reading or the resolution-that is a pretty cryptic thing-I am 
not sure which meeting we were referring to. 
CB - I will tell you - i! you want me to interrupt -that was the business 
meeting where ve decided on the rules of procedure. It was where we 
came in with our coaltion and we were going to take over and Tote 
on everything at one time at the end of it, and Kastemieier said •••• 
WF - That afternoon earlier we had been in a Democractic caucu,, backing 
Rodino. Don't you know that was a real heart-rending thing back there? 
CB - And that's why we didn't get together again that a~ernoon because we 
had to avoid the Democratic caucus. 
WF - We had made 1110re or less a committment to these~- We could handle 
the Demcrats and we thought it was all in our best interests to vote 
one tille and not be peppered by" the whole lot of • ea. I think I was 
thinking more about you than any-one else, Caldwell, because, as I 
said, a pickup truck in Roanoke can get up here in three hours. 
LAUGHTER. 
CB - I was on your side. 
WF - And only but a day to get up from Tuscaloosa. 
TR - And only two days from Moline. 
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TM - Anr,,ay, that afternoon I was drafting, and Railsback called and asked 
would Hutchinson fire you? No, I said, I don't think he would, and 
then he said that Cannon had the story. "He is going to print it and 
use 7ourname." I said that I'd pref er that he not use sy name - just 
refer to a staff member who's helping them draft. I recall we had a 
schedule to ~et back at 2:00; I had not finished the draft yet, and I 
called your LTR] office and asked if anybody was there. Bill Hermelin 
said that no one had arri Ted yet. 
TR - I wasn't there. We had a meeting at .3:00. We were an hou:r late, ::.and 
it wasn't a f"ul.1 meeting. I was there and I think one other, but I 
don't know who it was. 
TM - My recollection is that it 1187 have been around 3:00. I did have 
something, draft 5, that is in the book here. It is actually the 
first draft that the group received. Now I got back to Railsback's 
of !ice and there may have been one other person there. Final1y the 
meeting took place, and 7ou said, as I recall, "Well, here it is." 
This was number 5, as written here, but real17 draft number one. 
"Make sure the Members have it; 118.ke sure the coalition has it, so 
that the7 have a chance to look at it." 
CB - We had o..-ernight to read it. 
TM - So I delivered it to everybody-' s office, making sure that everybody 
had it. We can move thru pages 2 and 3 of the outline very quickly. 
The group never reall7 discussed that draft, but Wednesday morning 
we got into draft 6, which was really put together by Mr. Mann. 
Railsback and I were at the table. It was the 8:00 meeting on Wednesday 
to discuss article one. 
WC - It was not an 8:00 meeting. At 8:00 that morning was the ic'ednesda7 
group meeting. 
TM - It was 10:30 when we met in Railsback's office. 
WC - 10:45 to be exact. 
CB - No, that is .when you arrived. 
LAUGHI'ER. 
WC ·- I was there on time for that one. 
TM - Well, I was very confused at that point, because as I understood the 
meeting on Tuesday •••• 
WC - As a point of reference to time: at 11:05 you will recall we were 
sitting around discussing and ve got a call that the Supreme Court 
had ju.st ruled that Nixon had to comply- with the subpoena. 
Tape II, p5 
TM - Then Mr. Mann sent over by messenger a package that we thaoght was going 
to be his first draft or article two, abuse of power, and ve opened it 
up, and it turned out to be a re-draft of number 5 of article one. It 
took us a little bit to figure thatout. We weren't sure it was follow-
ing the same format or what, but we finally figured out it vas not the 
abuse of power, which he was supposed to do. So we have to turn to 
Mr. Mann in a. little bit concerning draft number 6; he had probably 
reworked draft 5 that previous evening. 
JM - That's right, I was still at it ; I wasn't ready. 
WC - Jim, do you recall that we had to turn all of our drafts into you and 
we each initialed our drafts? And said we wanted them back afterwards. 
JM - Yes, I remember that. 
TR - Why did we do that? 
WC - We didn't want them to get out. 
HF - For control purposes. 
TR - Ham, I don't remember that. 
CB - That was leak-proof, too. 
JM - The only recollection that I have is that I was still on article one 
going thru to the finish and having another input into the product. 
CB - You just don't follow instructions very well. 
JM - That's right, too. 
HF - Did John Doar work with you on the rewriting of draft 5 to 6? 
JM - Probably. I had Bill Blunt too. 
TR - Tell us about it, because that is very important. 
JM - I refer to Bill Blunt, whom I have identified, and John Labovicz of 
the i111peach.ment staff. They were on almost constant duty in rrr;r office. 
So every time I would come in with a new draft - Tom's number 5, for 
example, we would sit down and go over it and start working on it again. 
Whether John Doar was personal17 present at acy given time or not was 
unknown. I notice particularly on article two the times and dates up 
in the right hand corners of the various drafts. That was the practice 
of the impeachment staff. So most of the typing was done at the 
impeachment staff headquarters. That wasn't so ·much the ease with 
article one. But it was a mix of me and those two fellows and John 
Dear was in the wings all the time. 
TM - Was he contributing or what? 
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JM - We really need to interview John Doar; why not just call him and get 
his recollections? He came to see me that previous week before the 
committee drafts were · made available to the members. Laboviez had 
also come to see me. John Doar .had come to see me with those drafts 
two or three days before the committee got them, and he had the habit 
in this period to meet me at 8:00 almost every morning. He would call 
and say, "Can I come over?" And I said, "Yes." ..lnd that happened one 
morning during that prior week he came over and brought those drafts 
and wanted me to study the■ over and give 'llf1' opinion about them. I 
don't recall reporting back to him on those drafts. I had the same 
reaction that Tom has expressed: I thuught they were overstated and 
just kind of turned 'em off, and started to think about drawing other 
articles. During the process of drawing article one, I think his input 
was substantially less than it was on article two. My work was pri-
marily with Bill Blunt. and John Labovicz. And of course I have no 
recollection of what I might have done during the afternoon of Tuesday-
and prior to 10:30 Wednesday morning in the way of working on article 
one. 
WF - Well, article one didn't really constitute the proble■ that article 
two did. 
JM - That's exactly right. 
WF - I know that all thru the thing we were worried about article two in 
stating in common parlance a viable course of action [?]. 
JM - We mentioned just a minute ago, when the ·tape went out, that even in 
our initial meeting we spent Terr little time talking about o~nction 
of jurlice. We went right into those nitty--gritty pt,0bleie o! abuse or 
power. So it was just kind of a drafting and language problem that 
caused me to think that I should continue to work on article one • . I'11 
sorry- to say that I am more o! a last-ainute man than most of you are; 
I really- can't work until the pressure is on, so article two could wait. 
T!t- At that ti.me was there a De110Cratic group, a steering eonrl.ttee, to 
whom y-ou were talking? 
JM - I recall absolutely no input !'roin that group. 
TM - What group, !or the record, are we talking about? 
JM - Vell, I only visited with that group one time that I recall, could have 
been twice. I went to a roo■ near Jack Brooks' office in the far corner 
of Rayburn and just gave them a progress report am went over the 
language I had, and theymade one or two suggestions, but nothing of 
any substance. That was that. 
WF - Rodino's dratting group was Sarba.nes, Edwards, Conyers, and m~be Brooks. 
TM - Was this draft 5 or 6 that you were talking about? 
JM - No, I am inclined to think this was on article two. 
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CB - You don't think there was any-body that edited our article one? 
JM - No, I do not. 
CB - It was accepted pretty much? 
JM - I don't recall a:rr, other •••• 
'WF - Jim, I think we on the De110cratic side need to volunteer aore here because 
To■'s stuff here is orientated to the Republican side. I think we 
sloughed off SOM 110re important stuff on our side than even these gay-s 
know about. - that was the kind o! friction that vas building up on the 
Democratic side probably aimed more towards me than you gu'fS because I 
had been more outspoken and I had been more- the cutting edge in making 
sure that we seven were in the driver• s seat. Some of the guys were 
getting ticked off at me and I knew it. I think if there was an 
operable strategy- it was to get at my position [?]. You were gobtg to 
be the go-between on the articles because you had not made them mad at 
you, but I think some of them were suspilcious of what we were going to 
do right down to the last mimrt.e. 
JM - I recall one theme that ran thru the Democratic sessions, and we had twc 
tn,es o! sessions. One was back in Rod.ino's office behind the collllittee 
room, usual.ly at mid-day. And then we frequent~ had a earl.7 morning 
session in Jerrr Ziefman' s office back on the hall. There was one theme 
that built up during that time as we started off, when we 110re or less 
laid down the law that there wasn't going to be anr radicalization of this 
process, and that there would probabl.7 be no more than the two articles 
- or three. The ones only that were found in the docuaents. And we 
thought we had agreement ror a while that Brooks and Mesvinsk:;r and Drinan 
or whoever else were not even aoing to introduce their articles on 
Cambodia, on taxes, and the like. We thought we had that kind o! agree-
ment. That started eroding and the chairman indicated he couldn •t prevent 
the■ fr011 doing that. 
WC - Jim, did that st~ eroding after the procedural vote when Waldie and 
Kastenmeier kind of snuffed out Walter's theoey about not going back 
to vote each separately? Is that when it came apart? 
'WF - I thinks011e of them thought that the7 ahd lost me at that point. They 
thought I was going to end up Toting the other V&.1' on account of this 
nap. I don't think that lasted very long. 
JM - The erosion--well, 7ou can see vhat folks went for those - affected 
some people that we rea.il1' thought would not stick to theidea of not 
giving arrr credence to those other articles. 'We expected erosion from 
several people like Drinan, Holtzman, Coeyers, Mesvinsk:;r •••• 
HF - But the Democratic caucu:s had agreed, had it not, to withhold votes on 
all articles until the final article had been considered? 
JM - Yes, that was right •. 
TR - What happened? 
HF - What happened with Kastenmeier? 
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HF - I was the one the one who suggested that to Rodino. I said that I think 
[?] it would make it easier and he would get more people on our side if there 
was jW!lt one vote. 
WF - And we had tacitly assured you people that we could handle that. And 
then this caW!led a flap in our group. I just laid it out to them and 
the:, Tery reluctantly agreed to go along. I am not sure that Kasten-
meier was in there at that time. Then when I introduced the resolution 
a lot of guys on our side played golf and all of the other ! ellows on 
your side .wanted to make it rougher on you guys - the Wiley Maynes ,. 
went along with the Drinarus and the Cony-ers and the Ka.stenmeiers on 
our side. Eilberg was very cross vith Kastenmeier; he th01lght he'd 
broken a deal that was an under~anding. 
TR - Exactly. 
WF - Don Edwards walked past me, and I was down at that point, because I 
thought that we had been done in and we had broken faith with you 
people - that is waa.t bothered me. And this had been the first time 
that we had said we could do something and it hadn't worked out that 
way. And Don Edwards - he is such a nice gu:r , ~ even tho he is on the 
other side of most issues - said, "Walter, I don't blame you." In 
other words, his · old buddy Kastenmeier had violated faith and Don 
Edwards is not the kind o!' gay who would do this. And I said, "Well, 
Don, I try and not get mad but somewhere down the line I am going to 
get even." I hadn't done it yet. 
LAUGHTER. 
HF - You have a long memory. 
JM - You will find frequently during that week the Demccaatic members met 
prett7 orten. Most of the meetings were merely for progress reports ~ 
on the preparation o!' articles and questions. And of course there 
were two or three meetings on the specificity problem that arose. 
WF - So many of our meetings, as Jim as said, were times taken off the 
front end of the schedule of the committee time; that's particularly 
because our drafting err ort was alos a last minute effort. We walked 
in with article one about thirty minutes late because it had to be 
redone at the last minute. I know this put the TV announcers and com-
mentators in a heck of a bind, because we'd schedule a meeting for 
7:00 but not emerge into the main committee room until 8:15 or 8:30. 
JM - Getting back to article one. I had no independent recollection of 
having met with any group of Democrats. I am certain I didn't, 
frankly, to approve that language. But I did vith John Dear and so 
he had an input. 
WF - Jim, I don't think they really cared, do you? The main line Democrats 
weren't really concerned about what it was as long as Urey got their 
articles. 
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TR - How did Donahue come to introduce it then? 
JM - All right, Tom can reconstruct that as well as I can. The best available 
drafts we had at the time of the Donahue ·introduction, which was even 
before ve started the general session, came from~. 
WF - Donahue offered it to precipitate the general discuss_ion. It was 
primarily our [coalition's] work. 
JM - That was the best draft we had up to that point. 
TM - The one he actually introduced was 7, 8 •••• It was taken from our draft 6. 
And this was another constant problem. There was a disc~sion earlier, 
"Can we give these articles to Rodino?" You [TR] would say, "Listen, 
I am under some pressure. Rodino wants these articles, because he has 
to have something to lay on the table." 
JM - That ' s right • 
TM - And Mr. Flowers would say, "Well, wait a minute." There was considerable 
discussion of that these earI,- meetings, on a Wednesday afternoon. 
WC - Of course ve weren't sure of Rodino's use of Bob McCloey. 
TR - Yes, sure he was [?]. But what were the mechanics of getting our 
draft to Donahue for introduction? Did it go to Doar or did it go 
to Rodino or who~ 
JM - It went to Dear. 
WF - Donahue didn't even know where it was. Hell, he was just a warm body' 
- and he wasn't even veey warm. He just happened to be sitting next 
to the chairman; that was the only' thing he ever did. 
LAUGHTER. 
JM - We had our draft number 6, the best possible version of article two 
(sic?] to that point. And those were made available to John Dear to 
the committee, which was prepart!d for Donahue's introduction. I 
don't recall that there was e;er any reluctance about making those 
drafts available to Rodino. 
TR - No, I don't think so, not at that point. 
JM - The idea was as a matter of fact quite the contrary. We did as close 
as ve could to what we were going to propse on the table to begin with. 
That was the motivation I had - to get those drafts to the committee 
for that purpose. And so they-. were laid on the table as the Donahue 
resolution. 
TR - Did the Democrats caucus about that particular article, in other words 
did they have a meeting to see if they could all supprt it? 
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WF - No, I don't think there was ever any question about it. 
JM - There is no question about it, that was the beginning point, and eveey-
body' knew it, becauu we didn't include Cambodia, didn't. include this 
or that. The7 just accepted what we had readied. 
WF - Those ~s would have -roted !or aeything. 
TR - Sure. 
TM - Did the choice or Donahue haTe anything to do with the r act that he 
would not be running for re-election? 
WF - He was a neutral girr, a ranking Democrat. That's it. He ns next to 
the chairu.n. Peter used hi.a to introduce all kinds of resolutions. 
It was kind of understood. that this thing was just something to get it 
kicked o!f', wasn't it, Jim? 
JM - That's exactl7 right. 
CB - How was Sarbanes selected? 
JM - All right, I was going into that right now. We then continued to polish 
our draft of article one, but ve didn't finish it until Friday 110rning, 
when I walked into the collllittee meeting in Jerry Zie!aa.n • s office. 
A crowd gathered, we were sitting around on sofas and desks and chairs, 
and we just kind o! looked around the room. I in the meantime had given 
some thought as to who was a1cind of moderate sort of fellow wno could 
handle it to propose this slJbstitute, and I suggested Paul Sarba.nes. 
WF - It had to be somebody who was willing to do it. 
JM - That's right. 
WF - Someboc:17 who would be satis!actor:r to us; we didn't want Waldie or 
soaebod7 that would radicalize things. 
JM - You all check ae out on this. Somehow I recall a little seene in 
Rodino' s office when we did that. I t was inaediatei,- before the session 
and I remember almost where Sarbanes was sitting. It wasn't a very 
large group. Before I said it was in Ziefman' s office, but it was in 
Rodino' s office behind the chaaber with a relatively small gr0uj there. 
It lli8ht have been that Democratic steering conilittee. 
WF - I don't think it was the whole Democratic caucus. Sarbanes was 
nominated b7 a few or us there. 
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JM - The drafting cosaittee, we three, and the chairllan - I st:1ggested 
Sarbanes and he readily aceepted. 
WF - He was w:i]Jing. 
TR - That's a good choice, because in retrospect I watched him debate 
Wiggins. 
JM - And he hadn't even read the damn thing. 
TR - I'm telling you he's veey, Tecy capable and smart. 
JM - He's got brains. 
11( - Ma.7 I call your attention on page 4 of the outline at the bottom -
the points of discussion. This is a very- significant change with draft 
6, and the coalition misses it totally, and we regreted it la,ter on when 
we had to argue the policy- question. But we just llissed it. 
TR - We got killed on it. 
TM - First of all, the draft 6 that came back differed from draft 5, which 
reflected the discussion of the first meeting of the coaltion. It 
broadens "to take care of that" in the introduction. You can see 
where the thing.'·s broadened. 
WF - That's what Jill's talking about there. We'd all been to the • 
superintendency- issue. 
JM - I specifically recall with reference to language like that on several 
occasions verr detailed, tho not exactly' heated but serious, arguments 
with John Doar about language. This is his language. 
TR - Yeah, sure it is. 
JM - He insisted in various situations that this language is just not broad 
enough - il we cannot proTe this, we don't have a case. So 7ou've got 
to alle8e this or 7ou don't have a case, according to Doar. 
WF - Yeah, I remember that. 
JM - And this is a typical situation where that was his argument. 
TR - I strongly' disagreed rlth him on one point. 
HF - This language, which is grounded of course on article two of the con-
stitution, which specifies the oath, and then the "take care" clause, 
appeared in the veey first proposed resolution taat Mr. Dear gave _ us 
a week before. 
JM - Right, I noted that. 
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HF - It reappears rlth only' one variation in all their articles. 
CB - That is the first paragraph of article one that you are talking about? 
JM - It waS Friday 110rni.ng that we started detailed debate. We were late, as 
Walter said. We had .fiddled around back th.ere, got the draft multi-
copied, and ready to distribute to the committee, and got Sarbanes 
to agree. It was handed to us as we walked in, the Sarbanes substitute. 
If he had time time to read it, it was just while walking fl"om Rodina's 
office out to the scene, with no time to get cranked up. 'iiggins 
started in on him, and he kind of leaned over to me to get some guidance. 
It is hard to give guidance under those circumstances. 
TR - But he handled himself well under adverse conditions. 
JM - He did a marvelous job. What transpired, To11, betwean our meeting on 
Wednesday morning when we agreed in principle on draft 6, and the 
precise language which would be laid on the table Friday morning, I 
don't recall. Are there substantial differences between draft 6 and 
Sarbane's substitute? 
TM - I wouldn't say they were substantial differences, but 6 is the draft 
wherein the group really didn't mark it up. When we did rewrite s0111e, 
it was not so much substantive as it was just simply language and 
style changes that were being adopted now. 
TR - But you know it revolved around our unwillingness to ac~pt a.ey kind 
of unprOTen allegdion, like clemency. We insisted on changing langu-
age that we thought we could not prove, and we insisted on using 
language like acquiescing in and condoning and approving, rather than 
participating or directing as a part of a policy. 
TM - The outline on page 5 is so detailed because that is where the group 
actually did the drafting. We can kinda just run thru this. The word 
"policy" is the key, because in draft 5 we had had "course of conduct," 
which would eventually- get back into the final draft or article one. 
TR - We am ended the draft. 
TM - The :f'ul1 committee did that. You [TR] may well ha-.,e presented that 
amendlpent. But we missed this "policy-" idea. But f'rom the very 
begirming, as you point out., we were always willing to draw that line 
directly back to the President. [?] 
TR - Sure. But the key phrase was "has made it his policy." 
TM - And not impute improper criminal conduct of a.xv kind. That was always 
the test. The group always asked, "Can we direct it back to the Presi-
dent?" Then the members of the group would talk and remember this and 
that. I was fascinated, frankly, that you folks would recall so many 
facts, so maey details. We were not organized when Sandman and Wiggins 
attacked, but the group knew that the facts were there, but they had 
not ahd the time to put them together in organized fashion. But you 
folks were zinging in those facts. It was amazing - y-ou".ractual recall. 
. "~ 
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WF - Rails, you impressed me Tery much Wednesday night, your rat-a-tat-tat, 
and I know for a fact that yours wasn't prepared about an hour earlier 
than that. You didn't have any idea what you were going to say. I 
think you just regurgitated, that is exactly what you did. 
WC - I thought it was more like a bowel movement. 
LAUGHTER. 
WC - We got the other end. 
WF - It was very, very impressive. 
WC - It was. I have a note here, Caldwell, that you turned around and con-
grat ulated Tom after his statement. 
CB - I felt that all our weak hitters had come up before Tom., as m, wife 
told me later - that as tar as the Republican party is concerned, 
we weren't lookillg so hot until RAilsback. 
WF - Tom was the first ~ who had to cut the ~ard. out. or our entire 
group. You had pressure on you there. 
TR - SAndman was damn good in his forceful way, and here I was unprepared! 
HF - To■, you had giYen virtua.lly the same talk to the Wednesdq group meeting 
that morning, and so11ebody' in the audience suggested to you that 'i "':" 
your opening statement be just that. 
TR - But I wanted it typed. I didn't even have anything typed. 
WC - You were pretty anxious OTer that. I think we got together shortly 
before, and the press was hounding us. We didn't want to go back to 
his roo■• We didn't han time. 
TR - Yeah, we were meeting in our office. I didn't haYe . ti.lie to do a.nything. 
CB - We were meeting in you office and somebod7 kept bringing 1ou drafts or 
i.f' and you finally started to va1.k around and worked on it a little bit. 
TM - We were at the table, and he'd get up and walk around and lll&ke some 
noise - I guess getting reacy !or his speech that night. The group 
met until 6:30 and we were scheduled to go on national TV at 7:30. 
WC - And y-ou(TR] were getting re~ anxious. 
TR - And then I heard Sandman. I did not mind any of the rest o.f' them, 
but then Sandman - I could just see the Republicans out there cheering. 
McClory- was a marshmellow at that point. He was going to YOte .f'or 
impeachment, but he didn't s&7 that. He didn't even reall1 hint that 
then, on article one. 
., 
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TM - You will recall that on Wedne9day' we got a call from Frank Polk. He 
said, "I am working on the draft or article two, or something for McCloey." 
I went out. and took that meesage. 
WC - You mean article three. 
TM - It was McClor,y's ovn article two. 
JM - McCl01"7 has a letter dated July 25th, sending a copy- to Caldwell Butler, 
and I' ■ sure to others too. That was Thursday, even before we got back 
to article one. 
TM - There was a discussion whether or not to include Mr. McClO?'Y' or ask him 
. to join the group. It decided to send hill a draft; I belieTe Jimny 
· Butler attended that meeting. 
WF - Yes, ;rour son was there. 
CB - He carried over the McClor,y copy and he was greatly offended when McClor,r 
didn't co• out. am get it hi.melt', somie ~ grab~d it out. or his 
hands. 
VF - lih7 did ;rou gu;ys want McCloey to eoae down? 
TR - The more the merrier for us. 
CB - I think we ~zed the situation and felt that he wouldn't aake 8IIT 
positive contribution to the deliberations. 
[DELETED here are six individual coaaents on McClory]. 
TM - Going down page 5, look at C-2, the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. 
My- recollection or the first meeting is that Mr. Thornton brought this 
up and then we didn't have it until draft 5. 
RT - I believe that was in my original draft. 
WF - What do you mean b;r Water~ate Special Prosecutor? 
RT - The obstuction of Cox's e!'f orts to investigate the Watergate matter and 
the concern about his discharge and the other actiTities in October. It 
was a part of a pattern that I did see that 1ou 111entioned a 110ment ago 
as being a continuing obstruction of justice and abuse ot power which I 
did view as constituting a threat to our system of gOTernment, which 
requires that proceedings be brought. In that regard, rq original idea 
was to have a single article. That was, I beliewe, discussed by others 
too. I did think, Bill, that it was more appropriate to have the final 
element, that of the failure to compl;r with the comittee's subpoena, 
as a part or either the obstruction of justice or the abuse of power. 
And if you recall, as it final1J" turned out., I ■ade an ertort, to tie 
it back to article one b;r amending hat article. The reason tor Water-
gate was that it was part or the continuing pattern that I thought 
was important. · 
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TM - There was some discussion about that at' first; 1ou wanted to make 
coverup and continuing coverup a part of it. 
RT - It relates to the idea that I had that the nature of the process of 
impeachment was a safety valve to protect our system of government. 
That was the reason we had to go thru it: the danger was still there 
and that it was continuing. 
TM - Back up just a moment to B-3 on page 5, wherein we talked about. judicial 
proceedings and event~ about congressional procee~s. I recall a 
discussion about what we meant by judicial proceedings and we talked 
about the grand jlll"Y, the trouble of connecting a President up directly' 
with the grand jU?7. Obrlously' he never appeared before it, but the 
group, I think, spent a consdierable a1110unt of time in talld.ng about, 
"Can we link him direct~ in these instances of counsel.ling false 
testimony'?" There was some hesitancy to include "congressional pro-
ceedings." It got in there, but I think the group c·onrlnced itself 
that "judicial proceedings" was the proper term. 
iiF - We came- around to "congressional" on the basis of co-equal branches 
and the fact that we certainl7 occupied the saae status as judicial 
proceedings, in fact an even higher one. 
CB - We talked about the courusfllling o.f McGruder to perjure himself with 
reference to the Senate Watergate hearings. 
JM - That's right. 
TR - Yes. 
HF - When yuu sa7 "congressional," you were referring definitely to the 
Senate Select Colllllittee? 
CB - Right. 
WF - We added "approving, condoning, and acquiescing in" because we weren't 
sure that he had counselled, but darn sure approved and condoneQ. 
TR - Exactly. 
WF - In terms of what we had in his discussion with Dean of September 15th. 
HF - The giYing forth of misleading statements to investigative offices 
i~ toll.owed by an "or," and I think that in the first part we were 
thinking of Peterson. 
RT - Yes. 
HF - Getting information in the oTa.l office and transmitting it. 
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WF - Yeah. The inquiry' prosecution !orce had not yet eTol ved into the 
Watergate special prosecutor at that point, but it was a Justice 
Department force. 
TM - This is the one where the group really took a great deal or pride in it. 
We worked on this thing. On the outline it is D, and in the drafts it 
is D also. My recollection is the Butler influence here, for we had 
some trouble spelling••• 
CB - Surrepticious. 
HF - You are talking about draft 6? 
TM - Draft 6-D. 
CB - Here we got into "approving, condoning and acquiescing" - that was 
supposed to catch everything. 
TR - Which was wise. 
TM - I think that since the group wrote that from scrap almost, we took a 
geeat deal of pride in it. I don't think we would ever have approved 
that one to be amended in the tull collllllittee or aeyYhere else. We were 
very, ve17 haPP1 with that. 
TR - Right. 
TM - "Endeavoring to misuse the CIA" was in draft 5, but in draft 6 it appeared 
separte]Jr !or the first time. Looking at E:-2 now, Mr. Mann may want 
to coanent on that since you were the one who separated that. 
JM - Well, it didn't fit into C of course, in interfering with the conduct 
of investigations by the FBI and so !orth. 
WF - We'd probably' be stronger. We could make a firm case on that. We had 
the evidence; it was adequate. I don't think arrr or us thought it would 
be a sufficient articleon its own, but it was darn sure good standing 
there with the other stuff and could be proven completely. 
HF - Getting the FBI of! the scent. 
WF - Plus the Ellsberg case. 
HF - I think we were careful with the choice of the word "endeavor" because 
the evidence was so inconclusive. 
TM - Do you recall the discussion about Daniel Ellsberg? We were reluctant 
to put his name in there. 
TR - Sure. 
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WC - I think it was Walter who probably expressed the most reservation. 
CB - I think he [Nixon] was also endeavoring to m±sue the CIA, vhen he wais 
trying to get them to talk about Mexico or isomething. 
JM - That is really the main offence there. 
TM - Moving on t~-F, "destroying and concealing relevant material" - we 
were thinking about the 18½ minute gap but there was considerable diis-
cussion as to whether to put the word "destroy" in there. 
TR - Well, what they were doing again is using imputation ra-£her than direct 
evidence o! his invol vellJl!!lnt. There was no evidence that he did anything 
about the destroying, but he certainly did conceal after knowing. 
CB - That was Peterson's stuff too, right? Withholding relevant material 
evidence. 
HF - Did an;ything ever come of that ve"r7 technical session we had about the 
tape and about Rosemar;r Woods and the opportunity to erase it and the 
confiic:t of testimony as to whether it had been erased five times? 
Did she ever get into trouble? 
JM - I read last week she has an o!!ice across the street fro■ the White 
House and is sorting out the Presidnent's papers. 
WF - Who all do yau think really erased that tape? 
CB - Rosell817. 
TR - I think Rosemary- at the President's request. 
RT - I think so, too. 
WF - I would rather bet that Nixon did it and she was helping him. 
CB - When would you' say Nixon or Rosemary did it? 
WF - Down in Florida. 
RT - I think that the tape erasure was deliberate. 
TR - Yeah. 
CB - I would say the same, that Nixon himself did it, if he had the mechaniaal 
knowledge. 
HF - That's the trouble, because the ma.chine was so complicated. 
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WF - I bet he needed her help to run the machine. That is the o~ thing. 
He just decided that he couldn't trust aeybody else to do it. Ya got 
to handle it 70UMeU' ! You knov, that's what blew the tapes wide open 
becawse 70u got to the point where he couldn't get c·ontrol or the tapes 
himseU', except this one time. Anywhere else he had to go thru. somebod7 
else to get the tapes. 
TR - That's right. 
TM - Looking at G, the cleaenq- charge. I think, Railsback, 7ou were ■ost 
concerned about that. 
TR - I didn't know the edited tra.mscripts themselves dealth with clemenc7, 
and they- were so ambiguous and so subject to di!ferent interpreutiona, 
that I was very bothered about. charging hi• with re~ offering 
clemency. Altho he hitrt,ed about it, he discwssed it, and •••• 
HF - I wasn't that concerned. 
RT - I was. I know 7011 weren't; we discussed it. 
WC - I included in-, stateaent about the code words that were used - 7ou 
know they- didn't talk about •cleaenq." 
WF - That became sub-paragraph 9, didn't it? 
JM - That was included in "faTOrable treatment and consideration." 
TR - I agree, I like that• 
Rr - I expect we spent quite a bit or time on that. 
HF - I wasn't hapw with the final thing, we just weren't that sure. 
TR - That's what I aean. 
. . 
WF - I Toted to strike that when I u.de -, motion. 
TR - You did. Ve were both concerned about it. 
HF - The cases we had were an e.xaaple or the other side when he [?] and 
the President and Ehrlichaan in J~ were val.king along the beach in 
California, and he said, "Ho, we can't offer clemency-." 
TR - See, it was muddled up and it was Te"r7 cloudy. There were some other 
instances where he appeared to be sanctioning it. 
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JM - And Bittaan lied like hell. 
CB - or course he did. 
'WF - Well, I think 7ou were right, certainly in retrospect. That was a cold 
operation. 
TR - Sure. 
WF - Typical, 70u know, deception. 
TR - I a.a s-are sure you could haYe proved it. 
WF - It was -.r reeling that it was not as strong as the other, and we were 
getting into trouble to put itinto th.at categorr. 
HF - That's right. 
JM - I real]J don't aean that Bittman lied like hell. Bittlllln was at our 
heari?ig and when asked that question b7 St .Clair, he gave a partial 
answer that said something that clearly indicated that he wasn't being 
candid, 118.king tun disclosure, and I had the urge to follow him on 
the question, but I didn't and so we really didn't develop fro■ Bittman 
what all ve could have. · 
WF - I th•ught that Bittman was the true wadini[?]. 
WC - I spent a considerable time with Bittman on that one thing, about his 
approach to Colson. 
WF - I didn't think the truth was in Celson. 
CB - I don't want our little record here to indicate a weakness on this 
solicitation or false testimoiJT. The examples just don't occur to me 
right now, but there were several cases where basical.J.y he told McGruder 
•••• It's the bar association that he is reall.7 worried about.[?] 
WF - "We will take care of that, too. Ve can get his license back too." 
CB - Yes, all those discussions. 
RT - He'll know who can get his license •••• 
TM - "Tell him pe~onally I said hello, that I inquired about his fa~." 
CB - That is the Doar theory all along, a wink is enO'llgh if ;you wink at the 
right time. 
TM - Looking at H, disseminating information received from the Department of 
Justice" - that's Peter~on. 
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TR - Yes, it was a good, strong case. 
WF - I thought we had him by the yingya.ng there. 
TR - And you know from where? the edited transcripts r 
CB - Right. 
TR - They were stupid enough to leave that stuff in those edited trescripts. 
WC - Do you recall Wiggins' arguments on this, though? That under existing 
law 7ou could not support making false, misleading public statements 
that were impeachable unless ;you had a swearing on the Bible - that . 
type of thing - and was be tore a magistrate. That is the only time 
a case had comedown that ;you couldn't be accused of ll8king a false state-
ment on the leTel or impeachable offenses unless he had actually taken 
an oath. [?] Do ;you recall that? 
WF - I don't recall paying 11UCh attention to it, but I do recall the statement. 
But this His strictly the Peterson meeting where he'd called Ehrl.ichllan 
and Haldeman in from the ante-roo■• Isn't that what we are talking about? 
TR - Yeah, but it was a series of meetings - at least two or three occasions 
he promised that he would preserTe the confidence. 
CB - "You can trust me, wait until I get Ehrlichman on the phone." 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - Ehrlichman was standing right out.side the door. 
TR - Hem"7 Peterson, when he testified, tried to help in ,q judgment to 
kind or so.(ten it. 
WF - He did. When we pinned him dClf?l on "would you distinguish between simply 
sharing that information and suggesting that the7 take a course of action, 
which is what he did. He told Haldeman, "You had better get together 
with John and map y-our strategy .about the moner"- that was blatant. 
And also Kalmbach. 
HF - Tom [R] mentioned briefi;y that it was all in the edited transcripts, 
and this has alw~s amazed me. It 1>ook a careful reading, ;you had to 
read the edited transcripts or March and April of '73 back and forth, 
because matters came up and ma.y-be a month later the1 were discussed 
again, and you had a series of meetings. -But nevertheless, there it 
was, and it was given us and everything I had to conclude was that they 
never expected us to read it carefully. 
.. 
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TR - I'll tell you what happned in -air case. I read the transcripts very, 
very slowly. I came to that part and it kind o! bothered me, and then 
I read on, and there was some more or it. I talked to Cohen about it, 
and I asked some questions of Doar about. what might constitute a 
violation. Then the ~ Republic, Walter Pincus, came ou:t. with a 
whole column on this very thing. What a violation! 
WF - You geys read all those things, those magazines, all the time? 
HF - You see, Wiggins' argument have may some technical Yeracity, but the 
point is that there was Peterstm, the acting Attorney- General, the 
symbol, the cheif law-enforcing power of the United States, used and 
abused by this man. You cannot go higher. 
WF - This was the most shocking thing of all. I asked Doar before they had 
a meeting with Kalmbach, if' Kalmbach had ever received a phone call 
along these lines. I am not sure they ever really pursued that. 
re - A secorx:l ago, when Rails had been mentioning some rather uncompli-
mentary- thing about Peterson, you kind of smoothed it over. That's 
in partial contradiction to what most or you have said: most or you 
looked on Henry Peterson as perhaps the epitome of an excellent career 
man. How do you ~econcile that? 
WF - I think that Peterson was just trying to put it in the best light r or 
the Presidnet - that's all he was doing. He was a soldier, he wasn't 
a geaeral, all thru the thing. 
TR - Yeah. 
CB - That was loyalty-, but wasn't certainly- misrepresentation or any- kind 
of compromise of principle. 
TR - No, I don't think so either. Ir I implied that, I don't think I really 
meant it, but he certainly was trying to lliniJlize the possible bad 
effects of' it. 
CB - I think he's to be admired, though, for not taking the self-righteous 
view th.at the others did and which John Dean kind o! lets you believe 
he did. 
TM - Letter "I". Ju.st the term "White House," you recall that discussion? 
Page 3 of draft 6. W'e were talking about. the White House as an · 
entity, not the person of the President - the usage. !'.r. Butler 
couldn't get over the fact that it kept reappearing. He said we had 
to get rid of the term White HoW!le and put in something more concise. 
JM - That's in the next draft.. 
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TM - And then we moved on to the concl~ion. 
HF - That is well supported in the coaamaittee report by the extracts from 
the presidential utterances on television throughotit the period of 
a year and a helf. 
TR - Yeah. 
CB - The7 were all !ish in a barrel. 
TM - The concluion you get in draft 6 is somewhat different, quite different. 
in !act, from draft 5. Looking at number 2 under points for discussion: 
" an unindicted c<>-<:onspirator" was listed in this conclusion and that 
generated some lively discussion, it is ur:, recollection. 
TR - I surel.7 don't like it, I can tell you that. 
WF - Do you mean the question of whetaer we should leave it? I think we 
quickly came to the conclusion that it should not be in there. 
TR - Sure. 
WF - We couldn't accept some other tribunal, which this grand jury was. 
JM - That is a detailed factual allegation, it has no charge •••• 
TR - That's right. 
HP' - Let's carry- that a little further, because we never really became 
public on this issue. · 
JM - Well, we did. In all rq cri Jri naJ law experience I have drawn Umusands 
of indictments and that is w~ I probably may be in a llinorit7 on this. 
I think you have to allege general terms that deal with essential facts 
only" - no details. I don't know how this got into the draft. 
HF - Is it not true that excapt for the fact that he was President of the 
United States, he would have been nuid as a conspirator? Right? 
JM - Yes. 
HF - It would .have been done. 
TR - Is that from John Dear? 
JM - But on the legal question or whetaer the President can be indicted •••• 
WC - That was a totally inoperative .tact. Do 7ou recall in the Mitchell-
STans trial in New York, when they were found not guilty, the press 
canvassed us: what is 1our reaction? It has no bearing whatsoever. 
The fact that the1 were found not guilty does not infl.uence my action. 
And I said by the same token, if' they had been found guilty, it had 
no bearing. We cannot base our decisions on what somebody else does. 
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WP' - That's right. 
CB - We are talking about the -dra.f"ting session at which we aa..rked up draft 6, 
but if I remember correctly, we really arrived vith drafts 5 and 6 at 
the sue tiae, and we had to decide which one vas going to be the 
vehicle. But we pretty much read your draft 5 against draft 6, and 
systeutical.ly added several paragraphs to that. 
TR - ExactlJ°. 
CB - So what we really came out vas a sort of• compilation of the tvo. 
HF - What did yau. do next., Tom? How about seven? I neTer understood that. 
TM - Look at page 6, the !'irst part. The first rev minutes of the Wednesday 
afternoon meeting the group f ocu.sed on what they called the preamble, 
and at one time labored on the idea that would be part of article one. 
Mr. Flowers, I believe, indicated that. A couple o!' drafts bT Mr. Mann 
had one, and I belien I had bre-ught into the meeting one which was 
simplJ' given -to me by the legislatin counsel, which simply gave the 
historical fora or standard which we did amend. In particular, Flowers 
was concerned about "all the people." I thnlc you [WF] said. that had 
to come out: the word "all." 
CB - That's right. I remember Flowers said tht !J1 the people in his 
district did not !eel that way. 
LAUGHI'ER. 
And then aner we discussed this, we realized that according to most 
of the collllittee, the only things open for amendment were articles, 
and that the preamble was not open for amendment. So on that techni-
cality, we had to forget about the reamble !'ro11 there on out. That 
places ~ at the mercy of Harold Donahue, in regards to drafting the 
preaable. 
TM - That's right. lie vent back and looked at the preamble. 
CB - It wasn't too far off. We didn't find that out until we had gotten 
downtown. 
TM - Mo'Ving on to page 7 o! the outline and draft 7. We had some intro-
ductory language to the specific charges, the means used to implement 
this policy, having included but not limited to the policy [?]. 
We had in a kind of backhanded way got into that at some point. I 
think 1ou [JM] had a problem with Doar or somebody; you were working 
at that and we finally _ended up putting "one or more of the foil owing," 
and that was the lead-in into the specific charges. I neTer understood 
at that time where the problem was coming from - whether it was a 
problem of l~e or if it was substantiYe. 
JM - You are talking about the problem "of the following or one or more 
of the following"? 
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TM - Yes, those were concern:, that Ye had wheter or not we were going to have 
to proTe all the allegation or il a:rry one of them stadning alone would be 
enough for impeachment. 
CB - I remember the discussion. We were very sure that if we failed to prove 
one of the charges, the article couldn't follow. 
TR - That's right. 
WC - The other thing we were concerned about was the actual proof !or the 
Senate - that we had locked ourselves into the specific allegations, 
and your commnt that ;rou 11187 have 105% of the evidence btrt it may 
not all get in. That was the other concern, that much of the evidence 
that we had was not admisable. 
TM - One point that we finally- looked at were the specific;_ charges, on page 
7, point 8. That was pretty important. Ve kind of suabled across that 
under the pressure that the group had, and the speed'with which we were 
moving. We finally realized that was very, very import.ant that we move 
to the disjunctive. There were no changes in draft 7 until we get to 
page 3 of it, and then strike "and" and insert ~or." 
TR - Yeah, that was smart. 
TM - You know, we could have been nailed on that very easU,. But we caught 
it • 
CB - Did the draft work on number 7 take place in Railsback' s office? and 
also at the dinner at night? 
TM - Right - 7 and 8. We numbered them differently here, but !rankly they 
were considered 'Wednesday afternoon and also Thursday evening. All day 
Thursday I believe you were in devate on TV and never got together until 
Thursday evening. That was the ~ time we went over to the Capitol 
Hill Club for dinner, and really I am not sure who exactly vas there. 
RT - I know I wasn't, because I was going to have to make 1111' talk that night, 
and I was panicky, because it was the same situation that you [TR] had 
been in the previous night. 
HF - I was not there. 
WF - Read your notes, Caldwell - what do you have on Thursday? 
CB - All right. "We had dinner at the Capitol Hill Club. Hogan, Thornton, 
Frank Polk, RAilsback, Butler, Mann, and Mooney. Compieted draft of 
article one, pretty much like Donahue had submitted it. We changed 
burglary to illegal entry, al tho this is probably what they were con-
victed of, we struck out 'up to the preseent time,' with Thornton -
I guess he wasn't there. We inserted 'one or more.' We had some kind 
of hangup on the Ellsberg question but finally decided to laave Ells-
berg out of it, and finally we had some on number nine, that the perjury 
one. We added that language , 'or rewarding individuals.'" 
':'R - May I interrupt about Ellsberg? I think our concerrus about him were 
two-fold: one, the national security problem, and two, the fact that 
he was an SOB for doing what he did in the first place, and some of us 
....3 ~ -1, __ - ...L __ _ _ _ _ ...,! L 1 
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WF - We didn't want to look like we were supporting Ellsberg. 
JM - I think we made a political decision on that one. 
WC - Yes, his public image was such that it wouldn't help us. 
CB - I think that's a fair statement. That's all I have on 'Thursday evening. 
TM - It was kind of a relaxed polishing session. 
WC - Specificity had not become a problem yet. 
All - No. 
TM - But I have a vague recollection that Mr. Mann also discu:ssed article two. 
Back up a second. Remember Wednesday night just before we were breaking 
up at 6:30, that was the .first time :!fe saw your [JMJ draft or article two, 
abuse of power. And Donahue . eTent ually introduced that much later hhat 
evening. 
JM - At that time we did not have the McClory input into that one. 
TM- Now when was art.icle two introduced? 
JM - Well, it wasn't introduced until Monday. 
WF - It wasn't introduced until we got thru with article one. 
JM - But our first draft was the Donahue resolution. 
WF - He introduced both a.rticl~ one and two, right? Not three? 
TM - But at the relaxed dinner Thursday- evening, you [TR] had a couple drafts 
of article two, which we polished of! and then you went into paragraphs 
one and two. I don't have a very good recollection •••• 
TR - I don't recall that. 
JM - But I will when Tom starts talking about it. 
TM - You were talking about drafts 7 and 8, and you instructed me to pencil 
in the caanges made there on Thursday night and gave it back to me in 
Bill Shatuck's [?] office around 8:15, just prior to the beginning 
of the meeting that evening. So I went back to ,q office and penciled 
them in and handed you the penciled-in versd.on of article one that you 
would bring to & meeting FridS7 aorning in Mr. Mann's of'fiee, the 
first time we met there. 
TR - I don't even remember that. Listen, I think it would be a good idea 
to interview Hogan and Froelich too. 
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00 - Yes, we had thought of that. Perhaps one o! 7ou could set the stage 
by writing to them. That is important to get their recollections. 
CB - When dii they join the group and so forth? 
HF - I heard Froelich on the floor of the House, just sitting there, say-ing 
to somebody - a kind of tip-of! to me - several days before this, that 
he was really bothered b7 the interference with the agencies, particu-
larly the en:. This was really the thing, it seemed. 
TR - Yes, that bothered him all right. 
TM - Do ;you recall Wednesday afternoon, after the MeCloey-Frank Polk call, 
I think, that we did talk about brining other people into the group 
and at that point 7ou [TR] got up fro■ the table and walked behind your 
desk and called Froelich? 
TR - Yes, I did. When I first talked to him, he did not respond a!firmantiTelJ,, 
but he was not disinterested, in other. words, he didn't turn it off but 
he couldn't come OTer that first. time I ulced hill. 
WF - Now Polle came in strict~ at McClory' s request to do his work, didn't 
he? He was working in McClor.r's office. I hadn't known that before. 
HF - Yes, Frame Polle was working with MeClory. 
'WF - Polk sorta appeared with us fros then on, didn't he? He was very helpf'ul, 
too. 
TR - John Davisson [?] - wasn't that his name? - wasn't he helping you and 
got into trouble over it? 
WC - I tried to get Davisson to prepare some stuff for me and Garrison found 
out about. it, and asked hi• to stop what he was doing or get off the 
staff. And I told him that Garrison did not have that power, taat he 
couldn't deca.p at that point.. He was to complete whatever I had asked 
him for. I was still doing the agency theoey. 
DS - Was there a similar proba.e■ with Tom here? 
WC - No. See, he [TM] was not on the impeachment staff, while Davisson was. 
That became the question once GL-rison succeed Jenner. I guess my-
antipathy to McCloey goes back to his shift around on a Friday. He wanted 
to take over the Republican leadership role and he was going to be the 
new leader of the Republican Party as such, and Hutchinson was' ·no longer. 
He would be rankillg - it's been a long-standing thing, since Hutchinson 
and McClory came on the same yea:r and nipped a coin and Hutchinson became 
ranking. 
TR - I didn't know that. 
HF - I didn't either. 
·,.c - And because of the lack of leadership, McClory was simply gofM to take 
over the reins. That's the Friday when they threw Jenner out. There was 
~ 
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WC - a resolution, which we all signed, I can't recall what it said now, but 
it had something todo with Garrison taking a more active interest. I 
was just going thru nr notes here, and it was on a Monday that they 
finally canned Jenner, and McClory made a statement. I complained to 
Wiggins, "Dallll it, I will never sign another thing again it that is the 
way 1au are going to treat a representation you made. I vasn't told!" 
So it was kind of McClory taking over and reall7 trying to take control 
of pulling us all together and scuddling Jenner, which really didn't 
hurt too many peoples' feelings. 
WF - You all reaember Jenner's presentation after Doar's rambling statement 
where really zapped in and Jenner put us all to sleep. He knew how 
to lull ya. God Almighty! 
LAUGffl'ER. 
HF - It is too bad because these two guys had a tremendous opportunity to pull 
it all together, but they became advocates, and they dida't do it. 
WF - They didn't do it at all. 
HF· - But they had it there. 
WF - Jenner pulled it apart. He set us back, I thought. I remember thinking, 
can he really- be a successful trial lawyer? 
CB - I got notes like that all the wq thru. 
WF - What kind o! cases did he handle? He must have had a good firm, you know. 
TR - One of the best. But it must also be said in fairness to him that maybe 
he was preparing a good record. 
WC - But he did make a good speech about the Constitution, that first day when 
Doar made his presentation. 
TR - It was extremely tedious. 
CB - I think he demonstrates the value of regular attendance at the American 
Bar Association meetings, a good contact man. 
WF - Throughout the whole thing, I kept thinking that these gey-s don't under-
stand that we are lawyers. They are spoon-feeding us like we are 
nUJ11bskulls and they can short-circuit some of this stuff and keep our 
attention better. This is what concerned me so 1111Ch thru this whole 
thing - it was too darn elementary-. They assuemd we knew nothing and 
could comprehend nothing. 
DS - I wonder, could there possibly- have been the forethought of the Senate 
trial, where there would not be so lll&V lawyers? And the American 
people who were not lawyers? 
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TR - Yes - a good thought. 
HF - I think it is part of the whole way that Peter Rodino decided to conduct 
the thing - throwing this mass of evidentiar., material at the committee, 
not ever letting the coDlllittee to come down to making a decision on it. 
TR - I think it was a good idea, too. 
WF - We would never have seen the forest for the trees; they almost got the 
forest lost in the trees. There was so much mess out there •••• 
CB - That is vehre I have to take a little bit of issue with you all about 
Doar's s.nct'Jenner's presentation. They became advocates. They became 
pretty weak advocates. But that is the only time that they ever closed 
the gaps for us. 
JM - That is exactly right. 
CB - And it wasn't totally effective by a long shot. 
WF - I agree. Cates was a guy who wollld establish a theory, but it was all 
on the sidelines. You had to meet with him independently. 
TR - Which a lot of us did. 
CB - I don't think it was totally- objective. 
TR - Oh, no. 
HF - He was not. 
RT - I would like to say as !ar as my own view of the case was concerned, I 
think it was vital that we be given the entire mass. I still don't think 
the simple, quick presentation to us of the articles that we would wind 
up with and the supporting data !or those articles would have by itself 
completed the picture. 
HF - If we had one day on taxes [?], that might have been another article. 
As it is, the way things turned out, all those characters in that scene 
of the IRS and everything else, all who could have been indicted - what 
might have been the grounds? There were a lot of areas that we got verj 
short shrift in the evidentiaI7 presenttion. 
WF - True. 
TM - Well, the last day, on page 8, pa.rt F. This is the meeting that took 
place in Mann's office on F-riday aorning when he brought with him the 
typed up version of what the group pretty much decided on Thursday evening 
at dinner. My recollection is that we were there at 10:JO. Mr. Mann, 
Mr. Doar, and Mr. Polk and myself had a brief discussion. 
,. 
Tape II, p29 
TM - That is 'fr!' recollection - 8:30 [?], and RAilsbaek hadn't shovn up or 
any other Republicans and we sat waiting around about 25 minutes, and 
then you [ JMJ said 7ou had to go over to talk with the De110crats and 
you and Doar and Polle left. You said to wait there until the Republians 
came and tell thea to sit tight. You'ld be right back. Then Railsback 
comes in and discusses some points with Butler vho has appeared. They 
wait on you couch in your office for about 45 minutes or so, almost an 
hour. You !inal.ly returned and then you had a brief discll3sion about the 
finishing touches on article one. You instruct me to go back and prepare 
50 copies !or the Sarbanes substitute, which I did, and I got in there 
a little later, about 11:15. By that time s011ebod:7 had al.ready distributed 
a draft, a "final" draft, which really wasn't the final draft. Rather 
than hand out. the one I had prepared - and then they would have two 
"final" drafats - we just decided to go with the less final draft, 
which necessitated a number of amendments to bring it back to what the 
group had actuailJ" agreed on. 
JM - Yes, time ran out on us. 
TR - Just a coaaent on H on page 8. .ts I understand it, Hogan was concerned 
about too ma.n;r harsh allegations against the FBI, and he introduced 
an amendment to alleTiate that. 
HF - Had you met with his or did he just see the Sarba.nes substitute and 
started thinking hillsel!? 
TR - No, he had brought this up ever:, meeting we had. He was very much con-
cerned about the allegations about the FBI. 
HF - He was a former FBI agent.. 
WF - Don Edwm-ds is too. 
JM - And George Danielson too. 
TR - Danielson wanted to add the words "congressimial" to the allegations. 
HF - When did you meet with Danielson? 
TR - This was done in the full collllittee. I didn't. 
HF - They were spontaneous aaendment.s that they-made at the time we were con-
sidering the substitute one? 
TM - There were amendments to the substitute. Look at the very last dra.rt in 
your notes. A lot vent into that. 
TR - Yeah. 
, 
,. 
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TM - I am not sure where it came from. 
TR - I'll tell you where itcaae .from. It was the loth draft. Here is 
what happened. Sarbanes introdaced his substitute. Wiggins real.17 
started to pin him down: you have to actually proTe that the Presidnet 
had a poliq-, and Sarbanes squirmed but he handled it ve~, veey well. 
He really didn't 118ke it too erident that he was squira:ing, but Wiggins 
dida good enough job that I beeaae eoapletely convinced that we would 
have trouble showing that there ever really had been a "poliey." 
END OF TAPE II. 
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TR - When I was listening to Wiggins and Dennis exa■i ng Sarbanes about .the 
word "policy" in the Sarbanes substitute, it became very, very clear 
what they were trying to do was to make our whole case on article I 
depend on prorlng that Nixon had indeed had a "poliey"from which all 
of these acts followed. You know we couldn't prOTe that. I was con-
vinced that he did not have a policy, so that' s vtrr I very strongly 
felt we had to change that. And I tell y-ou we got a lot of nack from 
Doar and Jenner about changing it. This is the one area where this 
group had a real fight with the■ over changing it back to "course of 
conduct." To be quite honest, I still cannot understand vhy they in-
sisted on being so adamant about "policy." I didn't bU1' their argument 
at all. But. they- thought we finally just shoved this change down their 
throats. I think we. "Were right. 
WC - Yes, Doar insisted on "policy-." 
TR - Doar was adamant and so was Charlie Wiggins - for different reasons! 
JM - I think they- were a little bit M"er-stating. 
TR - I"ll tell y-ou this. I aat next. to Wiggins. lie were right, becawse the 
next day-, when I introduced that amendment, Wiggins and Dennis then went 
after me, and they said, "Under y-our language, does it follow that you 
have to prove direct involvement, does the President have to have actual 
knowledge?" And I just said that rq amendment speaks for itself. I 
kept saying this is very, very clear. In other words, I vas telling 
them, in effect, that you are not going to trap me, you are 'llf1' good 
.friends. I admitted that I did not believe in the superintendency- them-y, 
I did not believe that it was su.ffieinet to impute acts of wrongdoing 
to the President under any kind of Madison concept. 
WC - Let me interrupt you with a note of irony. Look at what has been taking 
place in respect to "CIA assassinations." Well, ve were taking -a lot 
of grief from the White House and from the Republicans for the notion 
that the President could ever be held responsible on the imputation theory 
for the acts of subordinates. But we now see our Vice-President suggest-
ing in his report that while there is no direct evidence of presidential 
ordering of assassinations, very clearly this would have to be cleared 
and the President would have known it. It is just the opposite now. 
People are being attacked in the CIA report •••• 
WF - We changed the whole course of human events. 
HF - We have come full circle on super:L,tendeney. Certainly in the limited 
category of your top advisors, once you know about the action, you have 
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TR - Now you are talking about knowledge, that• s di!!erent. I! he knew about 
it, then, as far as I am concerned, be had a duty •••• I think what we 
did was just the opposite. When you are talking about a President, when 
you are talking about impeaching somebody, throwing hi• oct, instead or 
being reelected, I don't think that you can hold a gu:y resposible who 
did not have aey knowledge, did not condone. [?] 
HF - But it• s still obstruction of justice. 
TR - Now wait a minute. There is a distinction where he has knowledge, or 
condones or approves. 
WF - I think we put an a!firmati ve dut7 on him "to take care." I! a gu:, is 
going to hold himself out and be President of the United States, he has 
got s011e obligations, some affirmative obligations. 
CB - You ['l'R] didn't state it that strnngly. 
TR - I guess I didn't. 
RT - I think it is interesting that here there is a now, just looking back 
thru the dra.rts. fhe words "course of conduct" that are used thru 
dra.rt 5, and with dra.rt 6, the word is "policy." 
TR - That's Doar. iie vouldn' t accept that. 
RI' - But the interesting thing is that since the Railsback amendment was in-
troduced, it did contain a "plan" in the disjuctive. 
TR - That "plan" was throwing out a bone, to be quite honest, as far as I was 
concerned. I didn't even want "plan" in there. iie agreed with "plan" 
in the disjunctive "or plan." It was strictly throwing them a bone. 
RT - Their position was that it would be important to be able to prove bad, 
malicious motive - a malum - on the part of the President., and that 
there had to be more than just a cour:,e of action theory. That had to 
be premeditation. That is what they wanted and that is wb;r "plan" more 
satisfied their position and yet _did not offend your position. 
TR - Yeah, with the- disjunctive. 
WC - As I recall, when you introduced that and Wiggins and Dermis jumped on 
it, you actually yielded to me to explain how come you used the word 
"plan." As I recall I tried to bail you out on that and said, "You 
used the word 'plan' becamse that is the word the President used in 
the edited transcripts." 
TR - Sure, a very, very good job. I just read lhat last night. You did a 
good job tying that language into the edited transcripts. 
r _, 
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WC - I had a different perspective on this from the outset - on whether or 
not a President could be held responsible for acts of agents, an agency 
theory. You simply can't have it both ways. You coulldn't do what 
Nixon was trying to do by concentrating all the now of the power thru 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman with the supercabinet that he had tried to 
develop and concentrate power in your executive office. And then when 
it came time to be accountable for what was happening, not be in a 
position to deny knowledge of whatever they were doing. I didn't think 
they could have it both ways. I just felt you could not just set up 
this man; you had a positive duty to know what's going on. -
HF - I think it's grounded in the language or the Constitution: to "take 
care" in the oath or office. You cannot just walk away from it. 
TR - Can I just express rq di!!erent feeling about vhat yuu are saying? I! 
I understand it, rq reeling is that under article II, he does have a 
duty to !aithfu117 execute his office. My' feeling is we could prove 
he had violated his oath of office, because he did or did not do certain 
things we could prove. We could prove that he tried to llisuse the CIA, 
we could prove he was a part7 to a aisuse or the IRS, in other words, 
I am not conceding that a aan can be impeached if his subordinates do 
something . coapletely without his knowledge, even if those acts are 
wrong. You llight s&7 he should haTe known, I aa saying the bureau-
cracy is so big that I don't thi.Dlc we should impute that. 
'WF - I don't think we disagree. He has a resonable duty to check on his 
subordinates. He can't substitute a lead wall between hi.a and Haldeman 
and sq· it stops here. He has a duty to take care that his alter ego 
is doing what is right. 
TR - Then 1ou are talking about llisfeasance. 
WF - Appraoching malfeasance. 
HF - He cannot position himself to aToid knowledge. 
WC - You are talking about an isolated example. Someone comm.ts an offense 
and it might be on your own strlr and 1ou don't know about it. How 
can they hold you accountable for it? That's not what we are talking 
about. This is where the "plan" comes back. This wae a course or action 
over a period of years, of holding meetings, and the tapes and so forth. 
That's what ;you have to consider. There is a difference, usn't there? 
The Presidl!lnt used the word in his March 22, '73 discussion with 
Mitchell: "up to now our plan has been one or containment" and with 
additional references to "we are adopting a new plan now" to .use 
executive privilege. That is how we bailed you [TR] out. 
LAUGHTER. 
TM - Before the Thursday night aeeting about article I, I had a difficult 
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CB - As opposed to "illegal"? 
TM - Yeah, he had "illegal" and fina.llJ' when I conn.need Doar that we had to 
change that .and .. called the court houae and asked them to read me what 
these men were indicted for, the charge. The code u.,es the word "un-
lawful"; there is no such thing as "illegal" entrr in the code. So 
we added "unlawful" instead of "illegal." 
RT - In the line ot the continuing nature ot the o!!ense, and "~bout 
continuing to the present ti.me" had disappeared, am I was TerJ 
pleased when that language cuae in there to tie it to the time or 
the offense. 
TR - Did it co• back in there, or had it le!'t? 
RT - It came back in the coaaittee. 
TR - Yes, I was against that. 
t6 - It• s after 1:00 now, the rain has stopped, and it rlllJ'1' be about. time 
to break up until this e-.ening. 
END Of TAPE Ill AND ~IOI OKE. 
